Beware cronies bearing gifts

August 28th, 2007

As I believe I said three or four years ago — aren’t we all tired of being “played?”

I believe we are … but nothings changed except our ability to NOTICE. These little assaults do not go unregistered now, gratefully … we GET it; we just can’t seem to get on with the guts it needs to defund, detach and denounce the Bushian coup.

So, notice today that the latest Loud Voice for the “we can win it” crew is Ayad Allawi, the interim prime minister of Iraq in earlier years, a devoted Bushie and CIA informant; he’s hired a big PR firm to give him the juice to get his message out … and some wonder where he’d get those six figures to toss around [neo *cough* con.]

Another lap dog, General Petraeus — known in some blog circles as General Betrayus — is already “softening” the facts for the Bushies … I’ll give him a bit of empathy; he’s so obviously been “set up” by this administration, sold like cornflakes and pinned with responsibility to make the unworkable work that moving in anything but lock-step is going to take more courage than can be found in the normal military mind. What? I’m calling this stellar General a sissy? Nope — I’m calling him an old paradigm soldier … like Colin Powell, loyal to the Commander in Chief no matter where that takes him.

Consider this quote from an article below:

The NIE, requested by the White House Iraq coordinator, Lt. Gen. Douglas E. Lute, in preparation for the testimony, met with resistance from U.S. military officials in Baghdad, according to a senior U.S. military intelligence officer there. Presented with a draft of the conclusions, Petraeus succeeded in having the security judgments softened to reflect improvements in recent months, the official said.

All that is being done in Iraq is postponing the inevitable — it’s a great cry to heaven, what comes next [with our name on it] … along with the tragedy of it’s having happened at all. As so many of us screamed at Bush when he designed this occupation — DON’T DO IT! PUT DOWN THE MATCHES! PLAYING WITH FIRE!

Now, bloody years behind us and with America [the first casualty] laying in the burn ward, Dubby is still standing across the room, gazing out the window toward heroic visions of legacy that dance in his head like sugarplums, smirking and continuing to flick his Bic.

Trust the little nit to put us in a position where leaving means we fail the [remaining] Iraqi’s who hope for a peaceful solution with none in sight; everyone KNEW this was a hornets nest but … gosh … it’s AMERICA doing the doing, they can do ANYTHING!

If anything crushes the myth of America’s “superpower” so effectively as our track record in Iraq [making no attempt to stabilize until too late, making no concessions to the culture or wishes of the region, making no attempt at oversight on a rebuild that remains an international joke] I can’t think of it … oh wait. Dubby’s done the same thing here at home … what the international community was looking for was the superior leadership we can no longer find here. Ahhh — myth’s die hard.

And, by the way, the newest worry in Iraq is cholera — not spontaneous pandemic as we think of it, but the direct result of a ruined and long neglected sanitation system. The signature disregard of the Bush administration. Next question — could it happen here? Wadda you think?! The 21st century, a’la Bush.

Legacy indeed. Some day the nation will shake its head clear and know they’ve been scammed by a fool — and I’m hoping compassion will win that day, not with a rope around his stiff little neck, but something more appropriately painful to an egomaniac … like razor-wire around the gawd-forsaken spit of dust and heat that is the Bushy faux-habitat in Crawford — and no phones or communication to the outside so we don’t have to listen to him whine insipid justifications for setting the world on fire.

Allawi, Petraeus, the smoke ‘n mirrors … below. The last piece is a DON’T MISS by Professor Juan Cole, likening our little Decider to Napoleon, another egomaniac … see? Alba, Crawford … perfect!

Jude

Ben Sargent ‘toon

War Deadenders Take Hope: The Surge May Not Be Working, But a US-Allawi Coup May Be On Its Way
Arianna Huffington, HuffPo
August 27, 2007

As we all await the Petraeus Report on the state of the surge, we may also need to be anticipating the Allawi Coup.

I’m talking, of course about Ayad Allawi, longtime C.I.A. asset and former interim prime minister of Iraq. He’s making quite the PR push to get his old job back, penning an op-ed for the Washington Post, hooking up with Wolf Blitzer on Late Edition on Sunday, and even putting the high-powered GOP lobbying firm Barbour Griffith & Rogers on a $300,000 retainer.

It says everything you need to know about who the true power holders in Iraq are that Allawi, who has a “six-point plan” for Iraq that involves replacing the current Prime Minister, is campaigning in Washington — not Baghdad. He clearly knows that despite Bush’s bathetic paeans to Iraqi sovereignty, the real deciders in Iraq are not the Iraqi people, but a few dozen folks in the White House and the Pentagon. They are Allawi’s true constituency.

So where does the White House stand on the idea of Allawi replacing current embattled prime minister Nouri al-Maliki? Well, it depends on whether you think Mitch McConnell was freelancing on Fox News Sunday when he jumped on the bash-Maliki bandwagon, calling the Maliki-led Iraqi government “pretty much a disaster” — or whether you think he was performing his familiar function as White House water carrier.

Could the White House be seeing in the blame-Maliki-for-the-disaster-in-Iraq meme an opportunity replace the sputtering “give the surge a chance” plan with a “give Allawi a chance” plan?

Let’s go to the Blitzer-Allawi interview to see what such a move would mean for the White House.

For starters, Allawi told Blitzer that his “six points call for a full partnership with the United States” and that his “objective is to develop a plan to save Iraq and to save American lives, as well as, of course, Iraqi lives, and to save the American mission in Iraq.”
Full Partnership? Save the American mission? Surely, music to the White House’s ears. And it was good of him to toss in those Iraqi lives — of course.

So what would an Allawi takeover mean in terms of U.S. troops remaining in Iraq? “If we talk around the region of two to two-and-a-half years,” Allawi told Blitzer, “I think we are in the right direction.” Who needs Petraeus buying the administration another few months with his report when the Allawi coup can buy them another two-and-a-half years?

And the White House doesn’t have to worry about Allawi knowing his lines — he’s already memorized the playbook. When Blitzer asked him when the United States might be able to start reducing our presence in Iraq, Allawi responded with a Bush classic: “As soon as the Iraqi forces are able to stand on their feet and provide security for the Iraqis I think the draw-down should start.” Ah: When they stand up, we can stand down! Misty water-colored memories. Being away from Iraq so much, I guess Allawi missed all those reports about the repeated failure of Iraqi forces to “stand on their feet.”

So exactly how would an Allawi-for-Maliki switch occur? Allawi says he wants to proceed by “democratic means.” But after being appointed interim prime minister by the U.S.-led coalition in June of 2004, Allawi had six months to campaign before the January 2005 legislative elections. He came in third with 14% of the vote.

When Blitzer asked Allawi who is paying for the $300,000 Barbour Griffith & Rogers lobbying contract, Allawi wouldn’t say. He was only willing to disclose that the “payment is made by an Iraqi person who was a supporter of us, of the INA, of myself, of our program, and he has supported this wholeheartedly, without any strings attached.”

As Spencer Ackerman of TPMmuckracker wrote, perhaps it’s being financed by Allawi’s old buddy Hazem Shaalan, who Allawi appointed as his defense minister. Shaalan is currently fighting charges that he stole $1 billion from the Iraqi defense budget (out of a total of $1.3 billion). That’s some way to endear yourself to the Iraqi people.

Allawi and Shaalan are also closely tied to the Iraqi National Intelligence Service, which is funded and controlled by the C.I.A. and which has been a persistent thorn in relations between the U.S. and Maliki.

Meanwhile, we’ll have to see whether Barbour Griffith & Rogers’ lobbying will be as effective with administration officials as it has been with Washington’s media gatekeepers.

Last week, Bush issued a tepid defense of Maliki, saying he is “a good guy, a good man with a difficult job, and I support him.” Hmm, didn’t he say the same thing about Alberto Gonzales? And Don Rumsfeld?

While I was working on this post, I got a call from John Cusack, who had watched Blitzer’s interview with Allawi from Berlin, where he is making a movie. He was stunned by Blitzer’s remark to Allawi, after he had read him Maliki’s quote about Iraq being able to “find friends elsewhere”: “Those words,” Blitzer said, “were seen here in Washington as pretty biting, given the enormous amount of support the United States has provided Iraq over these years.”

“Can you imagine?” Cusack told me. “We invade their country, an invasion that has resulted in over 100,000 — and maybe as many as 650,000 — Iraqi civilians dead; 2 million Iraqis having fled the country, with 1.14 million displaced from their homes within Iraq; and tens of thousands of Iraqis detained — with many of them tortured. After that ‘enormous amount of support,’ Iraqis have the temerity to complain?”

Talk about ingratitude. I bet Allawi would never bite the hand that feeds — and bombs — him. ++

Back To Square One
by digby, Hullabaloo
8/27/07

I’d forgotten about this.

It’s a reminder of why the bloodthirsty neocons, especially little Cowboy George and his sidekick Quickdraw Dick, loves them some Allawi:

Iyad Allawi, the new Prime Minister of Iraq, pulled a pistol and executed as many as six suspected insurgents at a Baghdad police station, just days before Washington handed control of the country to his interim government, according to two people who allege they witnessed the killings.

They say the prisoners - handcuffed and blindfolded - were lined up against a wall in a courtyard adjacent to the maximum-security cell block in which they were held at the Al-Amariyah security centre, in the city’s south-western suburbs.

They say Dr Allawi told onlookers the victims had each killed as many as 50 Iraqis and they “deserved worse than death”.

The Prime Minister’s office has denied the entirety of the witness accounts in a written statement to the Herald, saying Dr Allawi had never visited the centre and he did not carry a gun.

But the informants told the Herald that Dr Allawi shot each young man in the head as about a dozen Iraqi policemen and four Americans from the Prime Minister’s personal security team watched in stunned silence.

Iraq’s Interior Minister, Falah al-Naqib, is said to have looked on and congratulated him when the job was done. Mr al-Naqib’s office has issued a verbal denial.

The names of three of the alleged victims have been obtained by the Herald.

One of the witnesses claimed that before killing the prisoners Dr Allawi had told those around him that he wanted to send a clear message to the police on how to deal with insurgents.

“The prisoners were against the wall and we were standing in the courtyard when the Interior Minister said that he would like to kill them all on the spot. Allawi said that they deserved worse than death - but then he pulled the pistol from his belt and started shooting them.”

Re-enacting the killings, one witness stood three to four metres in front of a wall and swung his outstretched arm in an even arc, left to right, jerking his wrist to mimic the recoil as each bullet was fired. Then he raised a hand to his brow, saying: “He was very close. Each was shot in the head.”

The witnesses said seven prisoners had been brought out to the courtyard, but the last man in the line was only wounded - in the neck, said one witness; in the chest, said the other.

Given Dr Allawi’s role as the leader of the US experiment in planting a model democracy in the Middle East, allegations of a return to the cold-blooded tactics of his predecessor are likely to stir a simmering debate on how well Washington knows its man in Baghdad, and precisely what he envisages for the new Iraq.

There is much debate and rumour in Baghdad about the Prime Minister’s capacity for brutality, but this is the first time eyewitness accounts have been obtained.

A former CIA officer, Vincent Cannisatraro, recently told The New Yorker: “If you’re asking me if Allawi has blood on his hands from his days in London, the answer is yes, he does. He was a paid Mukhabarat [intelligence] agent for the Iraqis, and he was involved in dirty stuff.”

In Baghdad, varying accounts of the shootings are interpreted by observers as useful to a little-known politician who, after 33 years in exile, needs to prove his leadership credentials as a “strongman” in a war-ravaged country that has no experience of democracy.

[...]

The Herald has established that as many as 30 people, including the victims, may have been in the courtyard. One of the witnesses said there were five or six civilian-clad American security men in a convoy of five or six late model four-wheel-drive vehicles that was shepherding Dr Allawi’s entourage on the day. The US military and Dr Allawi’s office refused to respond to questions about the composition of his security team. It is understood that the core of his protection unit is drawn from the US Special Forces units.

The security establishment where the killings are said to have happened is on open ground on the border of the Al-Amariyah and Al-Kudra neighbourhoods in Baghdad.

About 90 policemen are stationed at the complex, which processes insurgents and more hardened offenders among those captured in the struggle against a wave of murder, robbery and kidnapping in post-invasion Iraq.

The Interior Ministry denied permission for the Herald to enter the heavily fortified police complex.

The two witnesses were independently and separately found by the Herald. Neither approached the newspaper. They were interviewed on different days in a private home in Baghdad, without being told the other had spoken. A condition of the co-operation of each man was that no personal information would be published.

Both interviews lasted more than 90 minutes and were conducted through an interpreter, with another journalist present for one of the meetings. The witnesses were not paid for the interviews.

Dr Allawi’s office has dismissed the allegations as rumours instigated by enemies of his interim government.

[...]

Mr Khadum added: “Do you think a man who is Prime Minister is going to disqualify himself for life like this? This is not a government of gangsters.”

Asked if Dr Allawi had visited the Al-Amariyah complex - one of the most important counter-insurgency centres in Baghdad - Mr Khadum said he could not reveal the Prime Minister’s movements. But he added: “Dr Allawi has made many visits to police stations … he is heading the offensive.”

US officials in Iraq have not made an outright denial of the allegations. An emailed response to questions from the Herald to the US ambassador, John Negroponte, said: “If we attempted to refute each [rumour], we would have no time for other business. As far as this embassy’s press office is concerned, this case is closed.”

Junior has only been able to execute people by proxy. Allawi gets to do it personally. He’s definitely a Bush/Nuge dream come true.

I think what’s most startling is that this happened three years ago yet everything you read about the occupation shows it’s gotten much worse. And now the US is trying to install this psychopath to bail them out. There is a special place in hell for the people who made this happen. ++

House to Hold Hearings on Two New Reports on Iraq
Karen DeYoung, Washington Post
Tuesday, August 28, 2007

The House will hold hearings next week on two key reports assessing political and military conditions in Iraq, jump-starting the debate over President Bush’s strategy even before long-awaited testimony by Army Gen. David H. Petraeus and U.S. Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, due the following week.

A completed 70-page report by the Government Accountability Office, to be delivered to Congress next Tuesday, paints a bleak picture of prospects for Iraqi political reconciliation, according to administration officials who have seen it. The second report, by an independent commission of military experts, is being drafted. But a scorecard on the Iraqi security forces released yesterday by an adviser to the group concluded that the Iraqis are years away from taking over significant responsibility from U.S. combat forces.

The two reports — and hearings on them in the House Foreign Affairs and Armed Services committees — will set a largely negative backdrop for Petraeus, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, and Crocker, who are expected to testify together in a joint hearing before the two House committees and in a separate session in the Senate. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) has objected to a Pentagon proposal that they appear on Sept. 11, a Pelosi spokesman said, and the exact date remains under negotiation.

Administration officials said yesterday that the Petraeus-Crocker testimony will closely follow the National Intelligence Estimate judgments released last week, which predicted continued political deterioration in Iraq but cited “measurable but uneven improvements” in the security situation.

The NIE, requested by the White House Iraq coordinator, Lt. Gen. Douglas E. Lute, in preparation for the testimony, met with resistance from U.S. military officials in Baghdad, according to a senior U.S. military intelligence officer there. Presented with a draft of the conclusions, Petraeus succeeded in having the security judgments softened to reflect improvements in recent months, the official said.

Bush continued his efforts to frame the debate yesterday, congratulating Iraqi politicians on an agreement they announced Sunday in Baghdad. The accord reached by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish representatives “reflects their commitment to work together for the benefit of all Iraqis,” Bush said in a visit to Kirtland Air Force Base in New Mexico.

The agreement called for the release of thousands of detainees being held without charge, reform of a law barring members of Saddam Hussein’s party from government jobs, regulation of the oil industry and provincial elections. Those elements are among a set of congressionally mandated benchmarks, and all require approval of Iraq’s parliament. No details of the accord were released, and Sunni politicians expressed skepticism yesterday that Maliki’s Shiite-dominated government would push for enactment of the measures.

Bush is scheduled to deliver today the second of two speeches designed to describe Iraq as caught between two forces that threaten U.S. security — Sunni extremism, personified by al-Qaeda in Iraq and the Taliban, and the Shiite extremism of Iran and its Mideast proxies Hamas and Hezbollah. The president plans to tell an American Legion convention in Reno, Nev., that an increase in U.S. combat forces in Iraq begun early last spring has been operational only for 75 days, a senior administration official said, yet gains are apparent.

“It’s understandable that political progress has been slower than security,” the official said.

In a speech last week to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, Bush compared the Iraq conflict to the Vietnam War, arguing that a U.S. troop withdrawal would lead to widespread death and suffering as he said it did in Southeast Asia three decades ago.

After the Petraeus-Crocker testimony, Bush will deliver his own written report to Congress assessing progress toward 18 congressionally mandated political and security benchmarks in Iraq. An interim report in July painted a mixed picture, and the White House is depending heavily this time on Petraeus to head off calls from congressional Democrats, and a number of influential Republicans, to begin withdrawing U.S. troops and turning security over to the Iraqi military.

In its benchmark legislation last spring, Congress arranged for its own security report, appointing a commission headed by retired Marine Gen. James Jones to assess the Iraqi forces. Strategic and military expert Anthony Cordesman, a commission adviser, previewed that assessment in a report yesterday saying it will be years before the Iraqi army and police forces will be capable of taking over.

Progress was slowed this year as U.S. forces increased their own operations and turned attention away from Iraqi training and force modernization, Cordesman wrote. Although the Iraqi army has shown improvement, he said, corruption and sectarianism continue in police forces. White House and military projections of a timetable for transition from U.S. troops to Iraqi security forces have been often revised in recent years and have proved unrealistic, he said. ++

Staff writers Thomas E. Ricks and Robin Wright in Washington and Michael Abramowitz, who is traveling with the president, contributed to this report.

Pitching the Imperial Republic
Bonaparte and Bush on Deck
Juan Cole, Tomdispatch

French Egypt and American Iraq can be considered bookends on the history of modern imperialism in the Middle East. The Bush administration’s already failed version of the conquest of Iraq is, of course, on everyone’s mind; while the French conquest of Egypt, now more than two centuries past, is all too little remembered, despite having been led by Napoleon Bonaparte, whose career has otherwise hardly languished in obscurity. There are many eerily familiar resonances between the two misadventures, not least among them that both began with supreme arrogance and ended as fiascoes. Above all, the leaders of both occupations employed the same basic political vocabulary and rhetorical flimflammery, invoking the spirit of liberty, security, and democracy while largely ignoring the substance of these concepts.

The French general and the American president do not much resemble one another — except perhaps in the way the prospect of conquest in the Middle East appears to have put fire in their veins and in their unappealing tendency to believe their own propaganda (or at least to keep repeating it long after it became completely implausible). Both leaders invaded and occupied a major Arabic-speaking Muslim country; both harbored dreams of a “Greater Middle East”; both were surprised to find themselves enmeshed in long, bitter, debilitating guerrilla wars. Neither genuinely cared about grassroots democracy, but both found its symbols easy to invoke for gullible domestic publics. Substantial numbers of their new subjects quickly saw, however, that they faced occupations, not liberations.

My own work on Bonaparte’s lost year in Egypt began in the mid-1990s, and I had completed about half of Napoleon’s Egypt: Invading the Middle East before September 11, 2001. I had no way of knowing then that a book on such a distant, scholarly subject would prove an allegory for Bush’s Iraq War. Nor did I guess that the United States would give old-style colonialism in the Middle East one last try, despite clear signs that the formerly colonized would no longer put up with such acts and had, in the years since World War II, gained the means to resist them.

The Republic Militant Goes to War

In June of 1798, as his enormous flotilla — 36,000 soldiers, thousands of sailors, and hundreds of scientists on 12 ships of the line — swept inexorably toward the Egyptian coast, the young General Napoleon Bonaparte issued a grandiose communiqué to the bewildered and seasick troops he was about to march into the desert without canteens or reasonable supplies of water. He declared, “Soldiers! You are about to undertake a conquest, the effects of which on civilization and commerce are incalculable.”

The prediction was as tragically inaccurate in its own way as the pronouncement George W. Bush issued some two centuries later, on May 1, 2003, also from the deck of a great ship of the line, the aircraft carrier the USS Abraham Lincoln. “Today,” he said, “we have the greater power to free a nation by breaking a dangerous and aggressive regime. With new tactics and precision weapons, we can achieve military objectives without directing violence against civilians.”

Both men were convinced that their invasions were announcing new epochs in human history. Of the military vassals of the Ottoman Empire who then ruled Egypt, Bonaparte predicted: “The Mameluke Beys who favor exclusively English commerce, whose extortions oppress our merchants, and who tyrannize over the unfortunate inhabitants of the Nile, a few days after our arrival will no longer exist.”

Bonaparte’s laundry list of grievances about them consisted of three charges. First, the beys were, in essence, enablers of France’s primary enemy at that time, the British monarchy which sought to strangle the young French republic in its cradle. Second, the rulers of Egypt were damaging France’s own commerce by extorting taxes and bribes from its merchants in Cairo and Alexandria. Third, the Mamluks ruled tyrannically, having never been elected, and oppressed their subjects whom Bonaparte intended to liberate.

This holy trinity of justifications for imperialism — that the targeted state is collaborating with an enemy of the republic, is endangering the positive interests of the nation, and lacks legitimacy because its rule is despotic — would all be trotted out over the subsequent two centuries by a succession of European and American leaders whenever they wanted to go on the attack. One implication of these familiar rhetorical turns of phrase has all along been that democracies have a license to invade any country they please, assuming it has the misfortune to have an authoritarian regime.

George W. Bush, of course, hit the same highlights in his “mission accomplished” speech, while announcing on the Abraham Lincoln that “major combat operations” in Iraq “had ended.” “The liberation of Iraq,” he proclaimed, “is a crucial advance in the campaign against terror. We’ve removed an ally of al Qaeda, and cut off a source of terrorist funding.” He put Saddam Hussein’s secular, Arab nationalist Baath regime and the radical Muslim terrorists of al-Qaeda under the sign of September 11th, insinuating that Iraq was allied with the primary enemy of the United States and so posed an urgent menace to its security. (In fact, captured Baath Party documents show that Saddam’s fretting security forces, on hearing that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi had entered Iraq, put out an all points bulletin on him, imagining — not entirely correctly — that he had al-Qaeda links.) Likewise, Bush promised that Iraq’s alleged “weapons of mass destruction” (which existed only in his own fevered imagination) would be tracked down, again implying that Iraq posed a threat to the interests and security of the U.S., just as Bonaparte had claimed that the Mamluks menaced France.

According to the president, Saddam’s overthrown government had lacked legitimacy, while the new Iraqi government, to be established by a foreign power, would truly represent the conquered population. “We’re helping to rebuild Iraq, where the dictator built palaces for himself, instead of hospitals and schools. And we will stand with the new leaders of Iraq,” Bush pledged, “as they establish a government of, by, and for the Iraqi people.” Bonaparte, too, established governing councils at the provincial and national level, staffing them primarily with Sunni clergymen, declaring them more representative of the Egyptian people than the beys and emirs of the slave soldiery who had formerly ruled that province of the Ottoman Empire.

Liberty as Tyranny

For a democracy to conduct a brutal military occupation against another country in the name of liberty seems, on the face of it, too contradictory to elicit more than hoots of derision at the hypocrisy of it all. Yet, the militant republic, ready to launch aggressive war in the name of “democracy,” is everywhere in modern history, despite the myth that democracies do not typically wage wars of aggression. Ironically, some absolutist regimes, like those of modern Iran, were remarkably peaceable, if left alone by their neighbors. In contrast, republican France invaded Belgium, Holland, Spain, Germany, Italy, and Egypt in its first decade (though it went on the offensive in part in response to Austrian and Prussian moves to invade France). The United States attacked Mexico, the Seminoles and other Native polities, Hawaii, the Spanish Empire, the Philippines, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic in just the seven-plus decades from 1845 to the eve of the U.S. entry into World War I.

Freedom and authoritarianism are nowadays taken to be stark antonyms, the provinces of heroes and monsters. Those closer to the birth of modern republics were comforted by no such moral clarity. In Danton’s Death, the young Romantic playwright Georg Büchner depicted the radical French revolutionary and proponent of executing enemies of the Republic, Maximilien Robespierre, whipping up a Parisian crowd with the phrase, “The revolutionary regime is the despotism of liberty against tyranny.” And nowhere has liberty proved more oppressive than when deployed against a dictatorship abroad; for, as Büchner also had that famed “incorruptible” devotee of state terror observe, “In a Republic only republicans are citizens; Royalists and foreigners are enemies.”

That sunlit May afternoon on the USS Abraham Lincoln, President Bush seconded Büchner’s Robespierre. “Because of you,” he exhorted the listening sailors of an aircraft carrier whose planes had just dropped 1.6 million pounds of ordnance on Iraq, “our nation is more secure. Because of you, the tyrant has fallen, and Iraq is free.”

Security for the republic had already proved ample justification to launch a war the previous March, even though Iraq was a poor, weak, ramshackle Third World country, debilitated by a decade of sanctions imposed by the United Nations and the United States, without so much as potable drinking water or an air force. Similarly, the Mamluks of Egypt — despite the sky-high taxes and bribes they demanded of some French merchants — hardly constituted a threat to French security.

The overthrow of a tyrannical regime and the liberation of an oppressed people were constant refrains in the shipboard addresses of both the general and the president, who felt that the liberated owed them a debt of gratitude. Bonaparte lamented that the beys “tyrannize over the unfortunate inhabitants of the Nile”; or, as one of his officers, Captain Horace Say, opined, “The people of Egypt were most wretched. How will they not cherish the liberty we are bringing them?” Similarly, Bush insisted, “Men and women in every culture need liberty like they need food and water and air. Everywhere that freedom arrives, humanity rejoices; and everywhere that freedom stirs, let tyrants fear.”

Not surprisingly, expectations that the newly conquered would exhibit gratitude to their foreign occupiers cropped up repeatedly in the dispatches and letters of men on the spot who advocated a colonial forward policy. President Bush put this dramatically in 2007, long after matters had not proceeded as expected: “We liberated that country from a tyrant. I think the Iraqi people owe the American people a huge debt of gratitude. That’s the problem here in America: They wonder whether or not there is a gratitude level that’s significant enough in Iraq.”

Liberty in this two-century old rhetorical tradition, moreover, was more than just a matter of rights and the rule of law. Proponents of various forms of liberal imperialism saw tyranny as a source of poverty, since arbitrary rulers could just usurp property at will and so make economic activity risky, as well as opening the public to crushing and arbitrary taxes that held back commerce. The French quartermaster Francois Bernoyer wrote of the Egyptian peasantry: “Their dwellings are adobe huts, which prosperity, the daughter of liberty, will now allow them to abandon.” Bush took up the same theme on the Abraham Lincoln: “Where freedom takes hold, hatred gives way to hope. When freedom takes hold, men and women turn to the peaceful pursuit of a better life.”

“Heads Must Roll”

In both eighteenth century Egypt and twenty-first century Iraq, the dreary reality on the ground stood as a reproach to, if not a wicked satire upon, these high-minded pronouncements. The French landed at the port of Alexandria on July 1, 1798. Two and a half weeks later, as the French army advanced along the Nile toward Cairo, a unit of Gen. Jean Reynier’s division met opposition from 1,800 villagers, many armed with muskets. Sgt. Charles Francois recalled a typical scene. After scaling the village walls and “firing into those crowds,” killing “about 900 men,” the French confiscated the villagers’ livestock — “camels, donkeys, horses, eggs, cows, sheep” — then “finished burning the rest of the houses, or rather the huts, so as to provide a terrible object lesson to these half-savage and barbarous people.”

On July 24, Bonaparte’s Army of the Orient entered Cairo and he began reorganizing his new subjects. He grandiosely established an Egyptian Institute for the advancement of science and gave thought to reforming police, courts, and law. But terror lurked behind everything he did. He wrote Gen. Jacques Menou, who commanded the garrison at the Mediterranean port of Rosetta, saying, “The Turks [Egyptians] can only be led by the greatest severity. Every day I cut off five or six heads in the streets of Cairo…. [T]o obey, for them, is to fear.” (Mounting severed heads on poles for viewing by terrified passers-by was another method the French used in Egypt…)

That August, the Delta city of Mansura rose up against a small French garrison of about 120 men, chasing them into the countryside, tracking the blue coats down, and methodically killing all but two of them. In early September, the Delta village of Sonbat, inhabited in part by Bedouin of the western Dirn tribe, also rose up against the Europeans. Bonaparte instructed one of his generals, “Burn that village! Make a terrifying example of it.” After the French army had indeed crushed the rebellious peasants and chased away the Bedouin, Gen. Jean-Antoine Verdier reported back to Bonaparte with regard to Sonbat, “You ordered me to destroy this lair. Very well, it no longer exists.”

The most dangerous uprisings confronting the French were, however, in Cairo. In October, much of the city mobilized to attack the more than 20,000 French troops occupying the capital. The revolt was especially fierce in the al-Husayn district, where the ancient al-Azhar madrassa (or seminary) trained 14,000 students, where the city’s most sacred mosque stood, and where wealth was concentrated in the merchants and guilds of the Khan al-Khalili bazaar. At the same time, the peasants and Bedouin of the countryside around Cairo rose in rebellion, attacking the small garrisons that had been deployed to pacify them.

Bonaparte put down this Egyptian “revolution” with the utmost brutality, subjecting urban crowds to artillery barrages. He may have had as many rebels executed in the aftermath as were killed in the fighting. In the countryside, his officers’ launched concerted campaigns to decimate insurgent villages. At one point, the French are said to have brought 900 heads of slain insurgents to Cairo in bags and ostentatiously dumped them out before a crowd in one of that city’s major squares to instill Cairenes with terror. (Two centuries later, the American public would come to associate decapitations by Muslim terrorists in Iraq with the ultimate in barbarism, but even then hundreds such beheadings were not carried out at once.)

The American deployment of terror against the Iraqi population has, of course, dwarfed anything the French accomplished in Egypt by orders of magnitude. After four mercenaries, one a South African, were killed in Falluja in March of 2004 and their bodies desecrated, President Bush is alleged to have said “heads must roll” in retribution.

An initial attack on the city faltered when much of the Iraqi government threatened to resign and it was clear major civilian casualties would result. The crushing of the city was, however, simply put off until after the American presidential election in November. When the assault, involving air power and artillery, came, it was devastating, damaging two-thirds of the city’s buildings and turning much of its population into refugees. (As a result, thousands of Fallujans still live in the desert in tent villages with no access to clean water.)

Bush must have been satisfied. Heads had rolled. More often, faced with opposition, the U.S. Air Force simply bombed already-occupied cities, a technology Bonaparte (mercifully) lacked. The strategy of ruling by terror and swift, draconian punishment for acts of resistance was, however, the same in both cases.

The British sank much of the French fleet on August 1, 1798, marooning Bonaparte and his troops in their newly conquered land. In the spring of 1799, the French army tried — and failed — to break out through Syria; after which Bonaparte himself chose the better part of valor. He slipped out of Egypt late that summer, returning to France. There, he would swiftly stage a coup and come to power as First Consul, giving him the opportunity to hone his practice of bringing freedom to other countries — this time in Europe. By 1801, joint British-Ottoman forces had defeated the French in Egypt, who were transported back to their country on British vessels. This first Western invasion of the Middle East in modern times had ended in serial disasters that Bonaparte would misrepresent to the French public as a series of glorious triumphs.

Ending the Era of Liberal Imperialism

Between 1801 and 2003 stretched endless decades in which colonialism proved a plausible strategy for European powers in the Middle East, including the French enterprise in Algeria (1830-1962) and the British veiled protectorate over Egypt (1882-1922). In these years, European militaries and their weaponry were so advanced, and the means of resistance to which Arab peasants had access so limited, that colonial governments could be imposed.

That imperial moment passed with celerity after World War II, in part because the masses of the Third World joined political parties, learned to read, and — with how-to-do-it examples all around them — began to mount political resistance to foreign occupations of every sort. While the twenty-first century American arsenal has many fancy, exceedingly destructive toys in it, nothing has changed with regard to the ability of colonized peoples to network socially and, sooner or later, push any foreign occupying force out.

Bonaparte and Bush failed because both launched their operations at moments when Western military and technological superiority was not assured. While Bonaparte’s army had better artillery and muskets, the Egyptians had a superb cavalry and their old muskets were serviceable enough for purposes of sniping at the enemy. They also had an ally with advanced weaponry and the desire to use it — the British Navy.

In 2007, the high-tech U.S. military — as had been true in Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s, as was true for the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s — is still vulnerable to guerrilla tactics and effective low-tech weapons of resistance such as roadside bombs. Even more effective has been the guerrillas’ social warfare, their success in making Iraq ungovernable through the promotion of clan and sectarian feuds, through targeted bombings and other attacks, and through sabotage of the Iraqi infrastructure.

From the time of Bonaparte to that of Bush, the use of the rhetoric of liberty versus tyranny, of uplift versus decadence, appears to have been a constant among imperialists from republics — and has remained domestically effective in rallying support for colonial wars. The despotism (but also the weakness) of the Mamluks and of Saddam Hussein proved sirens practically calling out for Western interventions. According to the rhetoric of liberal imperialism, tyrannical regimes are always at least potentially threats to the Republic, and so can always be fruitfully overthrown in favor of rule by a Western military. After all, that military is invariably imagined as closer to liberty since it serves an elected government. (Intervention is even easier to justify if the despots can be portrayed, however implausibly, as allied with an enemy of the republic.)

For both Bush and Bonaparte, the genteel diction of liberation, rights, and prosperity served to obscure or justify a major invasion and occupation of a Middle Eastern land, involving the unleashing of slaughter and terror against its people. Military action would leave towns destroyed, families displaced, and countless dead. Given the ongoing carnage in Iraq, President Bush’s boast that, with “new tactics and precision weapons, we can achieve military objectives without directing violence against civilians,” now seems not just hollow but macabre. The equation of a foreign military occupation with liberty and prosperity is, in the cold light of day, no less bizarre than the promise of war with virtually no civilian casualties.

It is no accident that many of the rhetorical strategies employed by George W. Bush originated with Napoleon Bonaparte, a notorious spinmeister and confidence man. At least Bonaparte looked to the future, seeing clearly the coming breakup of the Ottoman Empire and the likelihood that European Powers would be able to colonize its provinces.

Bonaparte’s failure in Egypt did not forestall decades of French colonial success in Algeria and Indochina, even if that era of imperial triumph could not, in the end, be sustained in the face of the political and social awakening of the colonized. Bush’s neocolonialism, on the other hand, swam against the tide of history, and its failure is all the more criminal for having been so predictable. ++

Juan Cole teaches Middle Eastern and South Asian history at the University of Michigan.

“So keep fightin’ for freedom and justice, beloveds, but don’t you forget to have fun doin’ it. Lord, let your laughter ring forth. Be outrageous, ridicule the fraidy-cats, rejoice in all the oddities that freedom can produce. And when you get through kickin’ ass and celebratin’ the sheer joy of a good fight, be sure to tell those who come after how much fun it was.”
~ Molly Ivins, 1944 - 2007

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Entry Filed under: Political Waves